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D o C om p anies View Bribes as a Tax? E vidence on
the Tradeoff betw een C orp orate Taxes and
C orru p tion in the Location of FDI
T im o th y G o o d s p e e d , J o r g e M a rtin e z -V a z q u e z , a n d
Li Z h an g

A large literature has docum ented the fact that high corporate taxes
in host countries deter foreign direct investment. In a series of meta
studies, de Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2008) find that the average
estimated tax semi-elasticity of FDI is -3 .3 percent. Altshuler, Grubert,
and N ew lon (2001) find that the elasticity of investment with respect
to after-tax host-country rates of return for US multinationals increased
(in absolute value) from -1 .5 in 1984 to - 2 .8 in 1992. Altshuler and
G rubert (2004) find evidence of investment tax elasticities of about 3
over the years 1992,1998, and 2000. Summarizing much of the research
on the taxation of m ultinationals, Gordon and Hines (2002) w rite that
the econom etric work of the preceding fifteen years “provides ample
evidence of the sensitivity of the level and location of FDI to its tax
treatm ent."
M uch of the w ork in this area has concentrated on developed coun
tries. There are, how ever, som e studies of developing countries, sur
veyed in Madies and Dethier (2010, p. 20). "M ost empirical studies,"
Madies and Dethier w rite, "conclude that FDI inflows into developing
countries are sensitive, to various degrees, to corporate incom e taxation
and fiscal incentives." For instance, Hines (2001) finds som e evidence
that Japanese investment is higher when tax-sparing agreem ents relieve
the usual tax that w ould be owed on profits generated in low -tax
developing countries. Klemm and Van Parys (2009) find that tax incen
tives help attract FDI in their sam ple of developing countries but do
not increase gross private fixed capital formation or grow th. Banga
(2003) exam ines FDI flows in South, East, and Southeast Asia and finds
that fiscal incentives attract FDI from developing countries and that the
presence of a bilateral investm ent treaty is important for developed
countries. Cleeve (2008) studies foreign investment going to subSaharan Africa and finds that tax holidays attract FDI. With respect to
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em erging m arket econom ies, Beliak and Leibrecht (2009) find signifi
cant tax effects for Central and Eastern Europe, with an estim ated
semi-elasticity ranging from -3 .3 to -4 .6 .
Yet recent evidence suggests that there is something different about
the relationship between corporate taxes and FDI in developing coun
tries. For instance, Goodspeed, M artinez-Vazquez, and Zhang (2011)
find that high host-country corporate taxes negatively affect incoming
FDI in host countries that are developed, but not in host countries that
are developing. Dharm apala and H ines (2009) find that taxes affect US
FDI in well-governed tax havens, but not in poorly governed ones.
Fatica (2009) finds that the sensitivity of foreign investment to the tax
rate varies with the quality of institutions in the host country. These
mixed results suggest som e natural questions. Is there something dif
ferent between developing and developed countries that affects the
estim ated tax elasticity? Are the results of previous studies that concen
trate on developed countries (particularly the United States), or analyze
sam ples that m ix developing and developed countries, prim arily due
to the sam pling of developed countries? If so, w hat lies behind the lack
of sensitivity of FDI to corporate tax in som e developing countries?
O ur starting point is the finding by G oodspeed, M artinez-Vazquez,
and Zhang (2011) that FDI entering developing countries and FDI
entering developed countries react differently to corporate taxes.
Though there are several possible explanations, in this chapter we
investigate only one: that firms perceive a tradeoff between taxes and
bribes. Previous papers, m ost im portantly Wei 2000a and Wei 2000b,
have reported that corruption negatively affects FDI, and w e found the
sam e in our earlier paper (cited above). Corruption effects m ay also
interact with tax effects, how ever, so the relationship m ay not be as
simple as it first appears. And there have been very few investigations
of the impact of the interaction of corruption and taxation on FDI, Wei
2001 being an im portant exception. Wei finds negative effects of both
taxes and corruption on FDI but no evidence of an interaction effect.
Dharm apala and Hines (2009) also find a significant interaction of
governance and taxes for US m ultinationals. Because their focus is on
the determ inants of tax havens, their interpretation is that small coun
tries that are poorly governed m ay recognize that the elasticity of
foreign investment to taxes is sm aller for them, and hence decline to
lower taxes to attract foreign investment.
One reason that good governance and taxation m ay interact is that
corruption m ay itself be interpreted as a sort of tax on doing business.
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If tax administration in developing countries is weak, the more impor
tant "ta x " in a developing country might be bribery paym ents or a lack
of the rule of law. Form al tax paym ents to the governm ent might
go unpaid without consequence if tax administration is w eak, while
bribery paym ents m ay be less easily avoided since bribes are usually
enforced by the bribe-taker at the m om ent of the transaction. Such
bribes could go directly to corrupt tax officials in exchange for over
looking tax evasion. In principle, bribery paym ents and tax paym ents
could be substitutes or com plem ents. If they are com plem ents, bribery
paym ents would be paid in addition to full tax paym ents. It seems
more likely that they are substitutes (so that firms would have to pay
less than the full tax on a combination of bribery and tax paym ents)
when the bribe paym ents go directly to tax bureaucrats in exchange
for reduced tax paym ents, since a corporation presumably would not
agree to pay more than the legal tax liability.
C onsider now how this interaction of bribery and taxation affects
FDI. The relationship between the two will affect how each alone affects
FDI. If bribes and tax paym ents are substitutes, the impact of each alone
on FDI will be lessened w hen both are present, w hereas the impact of
each alone on FDI will be strengthened if they are com plem ents. Take,
for instance, the effect of taxes on FDI. M any studies have found that
taxes negatively affect FDI. But if corruption and taxes are substitutes,
the presence of corruption should be expected to weaken the im por
tance of formal taxation in determining FDI location. That is, the elastic
ity of FDI to taxes w ould be lower in the presence of corruption; in the
extrem e it should be zero, as any effect of taxation could be offset with
a sufficiently large bribe. This is a question that has not been closely
exam ined in the literature.
By the sam e token, the im pact of corruption on FDI location would
be affected by the presence of taxation. If taxes and corruption are
substitutes, the im pact of corruption on FDI location would be most
acute w hen taxes are low. Conversely, if taxes are high, the impact of
corruption on FDI location w ould not be as important. The reason
could be that when taxes are excessively high corruption allows mul
tinationals to avoid excessive taxation. The argum ent is that when there
are excessive taxes, regulations, or bureaucratic red tape in setting up
a business, paying a bribe m ay "grease the wheels" and allow a busi
ness to avoid the constraints imposed by excessive governm ent (see,
e.g., Leff 1964; Liu 1985), including taxes. This does not, however, nec
essarily mean that such an econom y is more efficient. For exam ple,
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Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that bribes are actually m uch more
distortionary and costly to an econom y than tax paym ents.
Almost no one has exam ined this relationship between corporate
taxes and corruption em pirically Wei (2001) again being the exception.
Wei finds negative effects of both taxes and corruption on FDI but no
evidence of an interaction effect.
O ur findings indicate that there is a tradeoff betw een taxes and
bribes. We find that taxes and corruption are substitutes so that the
impact of taxes on FDI will be lessened when corruption is higher. Since
corruption tends to be more prevalent and tax administration w eaker
in developing countries, this helps explain why, in general, corporate
taxes have less of an im pact on the level of FDI in developing countries.
The substitutability result also suggests that the im pact of corruption
on FDI location is lessened w hen taxes are high. This does not mean
that an econom y in which taxes and corruption are high is m ore effi
cient than an econom y with high taxes and low corruption, however.
1

Data D escription

O ur main objective in this chapter is to explore empirically a possible
explanation for our earlier finding that corporate taxes are im portant
for FDI going to developed countries but not for FDI going to develop
ing countries. The explanation that w e explore is that multinationals
view taxes and corruption as substitutes. We use a panel data set with
information on 25 developing and 27 developed destination countries
from 1985 to 2002. The FDI source countries are the OECD countries.
For our dependent variable w e use the O ECD bilateral data on the (log
of) the total stock of FDI in a destination country in each year that
com es from each O ECD source country. There are reasons to view data
coming developing countries with care, and the O EC D 's source-coun
try data m ay be the m ost reliable such data available.
We follow the previous literature and control for factors that consis
tently have been found to be determ inants of FDI: distance, population,
GDP, the unem ploym ent rate, and exports; the last variable, exports, is
lagged to try to correct for potential endogeneity. The distance between
countries is suggested by the gravity equation as a determ inant of FDI.
The unem ploym ent rate controls for business cycle effects. Population
is a proxy for m arket size, which, ceteris paribus, should attract m ore
FDI. Exports control for the openness of an economy. Holding popula
tion constant, G DP is a m easure of w ealth and can be roughly inter
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preted as controlling for the return on investment or marginal product
of capital. Generally, poorer countries lack capital and hence should be
expected to have a higher return on investment than w ealthier coun
tries, ceteris paribus, which implies an inverse relationship between
GDP and FDI. We also include a source-country dum m y to control for
any observable or unobservable source-country factors that affect FDI
and that do not vary over time.
O ur corporate tax variable is com puted as the minimum of (1) the
effective tax rate faced by US multinationals calculated using data from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and (2) the statutory tax rate
from data from the Office of Tax Policy Research (OTPR). This variable
takes into account the fact that the statutory tax rate m ay be too high
because of accelerated depreciation and other investment allowances,
tax holidays, and so forth, that m ay be granted by the host country. The
effective tax rate in (1) is a simple measure of foreign taxes paid in the
host country divided by profits; if it is lower than the statutory rate,
w e use this m easure as a m ore accurate reflection of the true tax burden.
This m easure is also used by Hines and Rice (1994) and by D harmapala
and Hines (2009). We also lag our tax variable to try to correct for any
endogeneity.
We use tw o different m easures of good governance. The first is
a m easure of corruption, the "C orruption Perception Index" from
Transparency International. This index is com m only used— e.g., by Wei
(2000a,b)— and has the m ost coverage for the countries in our sample.
This index ranges in value between 0 and 10. It uses a higher number
for less corruption so in our empirical work w e subtract the index from
10 to facilitate interpretation.
Our second m easure of good governance is the som ew hat different
rule-of-law index of Kaufmann et al. (2009, p. 6), which is designed to
m easure "perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of con
tract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well
as the likelihood of crim e and violence." This measure is som ew hat
different from pure corruption, as it deals m ore with property rights.
It is available only every tw o years during our sam ple period, so our
sam ple size is smaller for this measure.
We should note that observations of the tax rate and the good
governance measures are available for varying numbers of years and
countries. In all, 52 countries (25 developing and 27 developed) are
covered for the tax rate for the years 1985-2002. The time span is shorter
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Table 3.1
Sample countries.
1

’ Argentina

27

Italy

2

Australia

28

•Jamaica

3

Austria

29

Japan

4

’ Barbados

30

Korea, Republic of

5

Belgium

31

Luxembourg

6

•Brazil

32

•Malaysia

7

Canada

33

•Mexico

8

’ Chile

34

Netherlands

9

’China

35

New Zealand

10

’ Colombia

36

Norway

11

’ Costa Rica

37

•Panama

12

Denmark

38

•Peru

13

’ Dominican Republic

39

•Philippines

14

’ Ecuador

40

Portugal

15

•Egypt

41

•Saudi Arabia

16

Finland

42

Singapore

17

France

43

Spain

18

Germany

44

Sweden

19

Greece

45

Switzerland

20

•Guatemala

46

•Thailand

21

•Honduras

47

•Trinidad and Tobago

22

Hong Kong

48

•Turkey

23

‘ India

49

United Arab Emirates

24

•Indonesia

50

United Kingdom

25

Ireland

51

United States

26

Israel

52

’ Venezuela

'developing countries

for our other variables. The corruption index covers 47 countries from
1995 to 2002. The rule-of-law index covers all the 52 countries, but only
for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. We limit our regressions to
include countries and years for w hich all relevant information is avail
able. The countries covered, their developm ent statuses, the definition
and sources of our variables, and su m m ary statistics are presented in
tables 3.1-3.3.
2

Em pirical A nalysis and Estim ation Results

O ur prim ary purpose is to explore w hether taxes and good governance
are view ed as substitutes by m ultinationals in their foreign investm ent
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Table 3.2
Data sources.
Variable

Further explanation

FDI

FDI stocks

Bilateral OECD data

1985-2002

Population

In 10,000s

World Development
Indicator (WDI)
2006

1985-2002

1985-2002

Source

Years

GDP

In current dollars

WDI 2006

Exports

Goods and services •.

World Bank

1985-2002

Tax Rate

The minimum of the BEA
tax rate and statutory tax
rate, where BEA tax rate =
foreign income taxes/
(foreign income tax + net
income) of all affiliates for
US firms operating abroad
in each country and year

Calculated with
data from Bureau of
Economic Analysis
(BEA) and OTPR
for statutory rate

1985-2002

Corruption
Perception
Index

Ranges from 0 to 0, with
10 denoting least corrupt,
transformed by
subtracting from 10 for
ease of interpretation

Transparency
International

1995-2002

Rule of Law

One of the six governance
indicators from the
Aggregate Governance
Indicators 1996-2008.
Ranges from -2.5 to 2.5,
transformed to 0 to 5, with
higher values
corresponding to better
governance outcomes.

Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi 2009

Biannual
data for
1996
2002, and
annual
data for
2003-2008

Distance

Distance between capital
cities of two countries

CEPII

Constant
over years

Unemployment
Rate

Total unemployment rate,
percentage of total
unemployed in total labor
force

World Development
Indicator (WDI)
2006

1985-2002
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Table 3.3
Summary statistics.
Observations

Variable

9,254

FDI Stock

26,136

Tax Rate

Mean

SD

4,171

15,060

31.35

18.23

Corruption Perception Index

9,546

4.097

2.533

Rule of Law

5,920

3.206

0.957

Unemployment

23,060

Export

22,710

4.780

7.838
72,579

105,246

Population

26,640

7,465

20,423

GDP

26,640

432,743

1,136,175

Distance

26,640

7312

4,729

decisions. To do this, w e investigate three specifications below. The first
specification is designed to set the stage. In this case, we allow the
coefficient on the tax rate to vary betw een developed and developing
countries:
LogFD Ii|t = a 0 + aiD ev_D um , + a 2Year_D um , + a 1Source_D um i
+ a 4Tax,/( + a 5Govemance„, + a 6Tax*Dev_D um ,),
+ X 0„Controlsm/, + u ,,,,

(1)

w here FDI^ is the stock of FDI in destination country i coming from
source country j in year t, Dev_Dum, represents a d evelopin g/d evel
oped-country dum m y, Year_Dum, represents a year dummy, Source_
Dum, represents a dum m y for the source country, Tax,,, represents the
effective corporate tax rate, G overnance is a m easure of governance
(either bad governance— the corruption perception index— or good
governance— the rule-of-law index) and Controls»,,, represents control
variable n.
A main finding from this first specification is that the m arginal
im pact of taxes on the stock of FDI differs depending on w hether the
host country is developed or developing. We find that lower corporate
taxes in the destination country increase incom ing FDI in developed
countries, but not in developing countries. O ur second specification
investigates one possible explanation for this result. It allows for an
interaction effect between governance and taxes, but does not allow the
coefficients to vary between developed and developing countries. It is
similar to equation 1 above, but has an interaction between gover-
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nance and the effective corporate tax rate and does not have a
developing-country dum m y:
LogFDIjj, = a 0 + <*1 Year_D um , + a 2Source_Dum ,
+ a 3Tax,y, + (^Governance,,, + a 5Tax'fG ovem ance,/,

+x 0-C ontrols^, +u ,|( .

(2)

O ur third specification investigates the issue further by asking
w hether any interaction effect between governance and taxes differs
between developing and developed countries. The third specification
adds a triple interaction of governance, the developing-country dummy,
and the tax rate, adds each of these variables individually, and adds a
full set of double interaction terms:
LogFD Iijt = a 0 + aiD ev_D um , + a 2Year_Dum ,
+ a 3Source_D um , + a 4Tax,/(
+ a 5Govemance,y, + a 6T ax*Govemance„,
+ a 7Tax*Dev_Dum ,/( + a s Governance,;, *Dev_Dum,)(
+a<)Tax*Govem ance*D ev_Dum ,/, + ^ 0„C on trols„,/( + u,;(.

(3 )
In all specifications, the sem i-log specification implies a nonlinear,
exponential relationship between the stock of FDI and the explanatory
variables. The pooled nature of the data can create a dow nw ard bias
in the standard errors due to repeated cross-sections (leading to unw ar
ranted significance of coefficients). We therefore present clustered stan
dard errors, which allows for an arbitrary correlation in the errors
of the cluster (the source-destination pair in our case) for all of our
regressions.
Table 3.4 presents results for our three specifications using the cor
ruption perception index of Transparency International. Table 3.5 pres
ents the results using the rule-of-law measure.
The first column in table 3.4 presents results with the tax rate, the
corruption perception index, the tax rate interacted with the a dum m y
variable that takes the value of one for developing countries and
zero for developed countries, and our control variables (including the
dum m y for developed countries as an intercept shifter). Except for
unem ploym ent and the dum m y variable for a developing country, all
of our control variables are significant. Population has a positive sign,
indicating that a larger m arket attracts FDI. GDP has a negative sign,
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Table 3.4
FDI, taxes, and corruption (corruption perception index measure). Dependent variable:
log of FDI stock.

Effective corporate tax rate
Corruption

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.0340” *

-0.0421***

-0.0364***

(0.0062)

(0.0095)

(0.0106)

-0.111“ *

-0.206***

-0.149*

(0.0317)

(0.0551)

(0.0869)

0.0041**

0.0012

Corruption x Tax rate

(0.00199)
Tax rate x Developing-country
dummy

(0.0031)

0.0218**

-0.0989**

(0.0105)

(0.0503)

Corruption x Developing-country
dummy

-0.336*

Corruption x Developing-country
dummy x Tax rate

0.0175**

Developing-country dummy

(0.188)
(0.0079)
-0.476

1.876

(0.337)

(1.177)
0.0167

0.0174

0.0150

(0.0132)

(0.0129)

(0.0132)

0.0043*

0.0046*

0.0049*

(0.0026)

(0.0025)

(0.0026)

-0.0031***

-0.0033***

-0.0031***

(0.0011)

(0.0011)

(0.0011)

0.0638***

0.0636***

0.0639***

(0.0068)

(0.0067)

(0.0068)

-0.114***

-0.112***

-0.116***

0.0043*

0.0046*

0.0049*

10.58***

10.78***

10.47***

(0.246)

(0.281)

(0.311)

Year dummy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Source dummy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

4108

4108

4108

R2

0.711

0.711

0.712

Unemployment
Population
GDP
Exports (lagged)
Distance
Constant

Clustered and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote p < 0.01 (***),
p < 0.05 (**), and p < 0.1 (*).
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Table 3.5
FDI, taxes, and rule of law. Dependent variable: log of FDI stock.

Effective corporate tax rate
Rule of law

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.0411*”

0.0656***

0.0633

(0.00605)

(0.0209)

(0.0636)

0.609” *

1.064***

1.647*”

(0.129)

(0.161)

(0.489)

-0.0258*”

-0.0244

(0.00566)

(0.0155)

Rule of law x Tax rate
Tax rate x Developing-country
dummy

0.0582***

-0.0380

(0.0107)

(0.0751)

Rule of law x Developingcountry dummy

-1.172*

Rule of law x Tax rate x
Developing-country dummy

0.0176

Developing-country dummy

(0.628)
(0.0225)
3.868*

-1.021***

(2.281)

(0.344)
0.0292”

0.0245*

0.0283*

(0.0140)

(0.0138)

(0.0145)

0.0087***

0.0088” *

0.0075” *

(0.0028)

(0.0028)

(0.0028)

GDP

-0.0032” *

-0.0035*”

-0.0035” *

(0.0012)

(0.0012)

(0.0012)

Exports (lagged)

0.0651*”

0.0653***

0.0673*”

(0.0068)

(0.0067)

(0.007)

-0.110” *

-0.106*”

-0.106***

(0.0144)

(0.0141)

(0.0145)

7.809*”

5.924*”

3.302

(0.614)

(0.694)

(2.094)

Year dummy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Source dummy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

2186

2186

2186

R2

0.709

0.707

0.712

Unemployment
Population

Distance
Constant

Clustered and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks denote p < 0.01 (***),
p < 0.05 (*’ ), and p < 0.1 (*).
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which we interpret as controlling for the marginal product of capital
or return on investment. Exports, interpreted as controlling for open
ness, are positively related to FDI. Distance has a negative relation to
FDI, as suggested by the gravity equation.
The first thing to note is the highly significant and negative effect of
taxes on FDI for developed countries, but not for developing countries.
Note that the specification includes not only the tax rate, but also its
interaction with a developing-country dum m y, which takes on a value
of one if a country is developing and zero if the country is developed.
Thus, the coefficient on the tax rate is that for developed countries. The
coefficient of -0 .0 3 4 is the sem i-elasticity of FDI to the tax rate, and at
3.4 percent it is alm ost identical to the 3.3 percent m ean semi-elasticity
of 427 studies as reported by de Mooij and Ederveen (2008, p. 12) and
mentioned in the introduction to the present chapter. Evaluating at the
sam ple m ean tax rate of 31 percent yields an elasticity of FDI to the tax
rate of about -1 for developed countries. That is, a 1 percent increase
in the tax rate decreases FDI by about 1 percent for developed coun
tries, som ew hat lower than the estim ates of Altshuler et at. cited in the
introduction. For developing countries the coefficient is m uch lower;
adding the coefficient on the interaction term yields a coefficient for
developing countries of only -0 .0 1 2 . M oreover, the standard error asso
ciated with this coefficient implies that the point estimate is not signifi
cantly different from zero for developing countries. Hence, these results
reconfirm the findings of G oodspeed, M artinez-Vazquez, and Zhang
(2011) that host countries' corporate taxes affect FDI going to developed
countries but do not affect FDI going to developing countries. Though
it is possible that some of this effect could be due to som e resource-rich
developing countries w here location-specific rents overwhelm any tax
effect, we do not pursue that line of reasoning here. We leave that for
future investigation and simply note here that developed countries are
also som etim es resource-rich.
The second thing to note about the results in colum n 1 of table 3.4
is the significant negative effect of host-country corruption on incom 
ing FDI. Evaluating the coefficient of -0.111 at the mean corruption
value of 4.1 yields an elasticity of FDI with respect to the corruption
measure of -0 .4 5 . That is, a 10 percent rise in the corruption index yields
a 4.5 percent decrease in FDI. This implies that corruption deters FDI,
and is consistent with the hypothesis that corruption itself is a type
of tax.
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The question remains as to why FDI entering developing countries
seem s to react less to host-country corporate taxes. As w as noted above,
one possibility is that taxes and corruption interact. If corruption is
viewed by m ultinationals as a tax on doing business, and if tax adm in
istration in developing countries is weak, the m ore important "ta x " in
a developing country m ight be the bribery system . Moreover, Shleifer
and Vishny (1993) argue that bribes are actually m uch more distortionary and costly to an econom y than tax paym ents.
Colum n 2 in table 3.4 begins to assess this argum ent by interacting
the tax rate with the corruption index instead of the developing-coun
try dummy. The result is a positive and significant coefficient, suggest
ing that com panies that invest in foreign countries do in fact view
corruption and bribery as substitutes to som e extent. H ost-country
corruption has a greater im pact on FDI when taxes are low, and hostcountry taxes have a greater impact on FDI w hen corruption is low. If
taxes are zero, the corruption coefficient is -0 .2 0 6 (resulting in an elas
ticity twice that implied by colum n 1), w hereas it is -0 .0 8 evaluated at
the mean tax rate in the sam ple of 31 percent (resulting in an elasticity
slightly low er than implied by column 1). If corruption is zero, the tax
coefficient is -0 .0 4 2 (som ew hat higher than that obtained in colum n 1);
if corruption is at its m axim um in the sam ple, the tax coefficient is close
to zero.
Column 2 of table 3.4 thus supports the proposition that taxes and
corruption are substitutes. This suggests that the result that host cor
porate taxes do not affect FDI entering developing countries is due to
corruption in developing countries, combined perhaps with w eak tax
administration. However, there m ay be other reasons that developing
countries are different. To test this, colum n 3 adds a triple interaction
of corruption, the tax rate, and the developing-country dum m y, along
with double interactions of the tax rate and corruption, the developingcountry dum m y and the tax rate, and the developing-country dum m y
and corruption.
We begin our discussion of colum n 3 by focusing on the tax rate.
The interaction of corruption with the tax rate is insignificant in column
3, so the coefficient on the tax rate of -0 .0 3 6 4 is that for developed
countries. M oreover the coefficient is not significantly different from
that of colum n 1. The coefficient for developing countries involves
several term s: -0 .0 3 6 4 - 0.0989 (from interaction between the tax rate
and the developing-country dum m y ) + 0.00117 x corruption (from
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interaction betw een the tax rate and corruption) + 0.0175 x corruption
(from the triple interaction). Evaluating at the mean corruption value
for developing countries of 6.5 and adding together yields a coefficient
of -0 .0 1 4 for developing countries. This is consistent with the findings
of colum n 1, but gives a m ore nuanced picture: the marginal effect of
taxes is low for developing countries with high corruption, whereas
those with low corruption m ay indeed find that taxes are an important
factor in FDI location. W hen corruption is high, bribes that go to corrupt
tax officials m ay make a high tax rate irrelevant, as the taxes are evaded,
and the level of corruption becom es the more important force for
FDI. From a dom estic political view point, high tax rates m ay protect
the interests of corrupt tax officials in soliciting bribes from foreign
investors.
Turning to the coefficient on corruption in colum n 3, w e see that the
value for developed countries is -0 .1 4 9 , since the interaction of corrup
tion and the tax rate is insignificant and the value for the developingcountry dum m y is zero. This is som ew hat higher than the estim ate for
colum n 1. For developing countries, the estim ate is -0 .1 4 9 - 0.336
(from the interaction between corruption and the developing-country
d um m y) + 0 0.00117 x tax rate (from the interaction between the tax
rate and corruption) + 0.0175 x tax rate (from the triple interaction).
A dding yields a coefficient of -0 .4 8 5 + 0.0187 x tax rate for developing
countries. This is a striking result. If tax rates are low in the host
country, then corruption indeed low ers host-country FDI. Flowever, as
the tax rate rises, the im pact of corruption becom es smaller. Indeed, if
tax rates are very high, corruption actually leads to higher FDI in
developing countries. The explanation would appear to be that with
excessive corporate taxation, corruption, presum ably in the form of
bribing the tax authorities, allows m ultinationals to avoid the high
taxes, thus increasing FDI.
An alternative variable to the corruption perception index is the
rule-of-law m easure of Kaufm ann, Kraay, and M astruzzi (2009). This
m easure, as described above, is m ore focused on property rights than
on bribes
Table 3.5 presents results based on the rule-of-law measure. In
general, the results are similar to those presented in table 3.4, although
the coefficients in the specification with the triple interaction have less
statistical significance.
We begin by discussing the results for colum n 1. All control variables
have the sam e sign as in table 3.4, and all are significant, including
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unem ploym ent (which w as insignificant in table 3.4). The coefficient
on the corporate tax rate is that for developed countries and is negative
and significant, with a slightly higher coefficient of -0 .0 4 1 , and a cor
respondingly higher elasticity estim ate of about -1 .2 5 . The estim ate for
developing countries is 0.0171— a positive num ber that m ay at first be
puzzling. However, considering the findings of columns 2 and 3 of
table 3.4 (that corruption and taxes in fact interact), this could reflect a
similar phenomenon with respect to taxes and the rule of law. The
coefficient on the rule of law is positive and significant— greater respect
for property rights increases FDI. The elasticity of FDI with respect to
the rule of law evaluated at the mean is close to 2.
Column 2 of table 3.5 uses an interaction of the tax rate with the
rule of law instead of colum n l 's interaction of the tax rate with a
developing-country dummy. As in table 3.4, there is a significant inter
action effect suggesting that the rule of law and corporate taxes are
viewed as substitutes by multinational firms. W hen the rule of law is
high, the corporate tax deters FDI, but at low levels of the rule of law
the corporate tax rate actually has a positive effect on FDI. Evaluated
at the m ean rule-of-law value of developing countries, the coefficient
on the corporate tax rate is very close to zero (0.004). Evaluating at the
mean rule-of-law value of developed countries, the coefficient on the
corporate tax rate is -0 .0 3 8 , close to the value estimated in colum n 1 of
table 3.5 as well as to estim ates from table 3.4. The results of colum n 2
thus support the result that FDI responds to corporate taxes in devel
oped but not developing countries. The mechanism suggested by this
colum n is that the rule of law interacts with the tax rate, and when the
rule of law is low (as it is in developing countries) the marginal impact
of corporate taxes on FDI location is blunted.
The coefficient of the rule of law in colum n 2 is positive and signifi
cant, but its impact is reduced as the corporate tax rate rises. If the
corporate tax rate were zero, the elasticity of FDI and the rule of law
would be alm ost 3.4 w hen evaluated at the m ean value for the rule of
law. As the corporate tax rate rises, the elasticity falls, however. The
elasticity of FDI and the rule of law fall to 2.6 when the tax rate is at
its mean in the sam ple (31.4 percent). This result is similar to the result
of table 3.4 with respect to corruption: w hen corporate taxes become
excessively high, marginal im provem ents in property rights have less
of an effect on FDI location.
The final colum n of table 3.5 adds the triple interaction term as well
as double interaction term s. The rule of law is positive and significant
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and the interaction of the rule of law and the tax rate is negative, but
not significant. The rule of law interacted with the developing-country
dum m y is negative and significant, but the triple interaction term is
insignificant. A s many of the interaction term s are insignificant, this
colum n reveals less, but it suggests a high elasticity of FDI to the rule
of law for developed countries (5.3), with a som ew hat lower but still
relatively high elasticity for developing countries (1.5). These results
seem to confirm the im portance of the rule of law in both developed
and developing countries.
3

Conclusion

There is a large literature docum enting that high corporate taxes in host
countries deter foreign direct investment. H ow ever, some recent papers
have questioned the robustness of this result in developing countries.
A m ong the papers that do so are G oodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and
Zhang 2011 (in which w e find that host countries' taxes affect FDI
entering developed but not developing countries), a 2009 p aper by
Dharmapala and Hines (who find that taxes affect US FDI in wellgoverned tax havens but not those that are poorly governed), and a
2009 paper by Fatica (w ho finds that the sensitivity of foreign invest
ment to the tax rate varies with the institutional quality of the host
country).
In this ch apter we have investigated one of the possible explanations
for a w eaker relationship betw een corporate taxes and FDI in develop
ing countries: the presence of a tradeoff between taxes and corruption.
Although som e previous papers have docum ented a negative effect of
corruption on FDI, little w ork has been done on how governance may
interact with taxes. In this chapter w e hypothesized that the presence
of corruption weakens the influence of corporate taxes in the location
of FDI because bribes and w eak tax enforcem ent tend to reduce the
cost of taxes, and corruption becom es the m ore im portant cost for
multinationals. Since corruption tends to be m ore prevalent and tax
administration w eaker in developing countries, this helps explain why,
in general, corporate taxes have less of an im pact on FDI location in
the developing countries.
We have explored the interaction of corporate taxes, governance,
and developing countries, using several empirical specifications. We
have used tw o measures of governance in our specifications, one a
corruption index and the other a m easure of the rule of law measure.
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Before sum m arizing our findings, w e should note that our results
use aggregate data and that identification com es from cross-sectional
variation. Further research using disaggregated data and other identi
fication strategies w ould be highly desirable.
In our estimations w e found, first, a highly significant and negative
effect of taxes on FDI for developed countries, but not for developing
countries, and a separate individual significant negative effect of cor
ruption in the host country and positive effect of the rule of law on
incoming FDI. Second w e found that foreign investors view taxation
and bribery to some extent as substitutes. H ost-country corruption has
a greater effect on FDI when taxes are low, and host-country taxes have
a greater effect on FDI w hen corruption is low. This suggests that one
part of the explanation of our first finding that host-country corporate
taxes do not affect FDI entering developing countries is that corporate
taxes and corruption are acting as substitutes in developing countries.
O ur results with respect to the rule of law indicate that the sam e rea
soning w ould explain D harm apala and Hines' result that low taxes in
tax havens affect FDI if the tax haven is well governed but not if the
tax haven is poorly governed.
Third, w e found that the marginal effect of taxes is low for develop
ing countries with high corruption while developing countries with
low corruption may indeed find that taxes are an important factor in
FDI location. The explanation is that bribes that go to corrupt tax offi
cials m ake a high tax rate irrelevant as the taxes are evaded. We also
found that the marginal effect of corruption on FDI location falls as the
corporate marginal tax rate rises. The explanation would appear to
be that with high levels of formal taxation corruption allows foreign
investm ent to avoid the excessively high taxes. But the result is likely
to be m ore costly for the host econom y as suggested by the argum ent
of Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
From the view point of political economy, our results m ay help to
explain w hy it is still com m on to find tax codes in developing countries
with high statutory corporate tax rates. Keeping those rates high may
protect the interests of corrupt tax officials in soliciting bribes from
foreign investors. H ow ever, some of those rents may be diminished
with the introduction of formal tax holidays and incentives. If the holi
days and incentives apply only to foreign investors, this could reduce
both the tax burden and bribes solicited from reluctant-to-pay foreign
investors, while maintaining rents due to high tax rates and bribes from
dom estic firms.

62

G oodspeed, M artinez-Vazquez, and Zhang

A cknow ledgm ents
We gratefully acknow ledge the com m ents of participants in the CESifo
Venice Sum m er Institute 2010 conference on Taxation in Developing
Countries, especially our discussant G eorge Zodrow , and the reviewers
of this chapter.
References
Altshuler, Rosanne, and Harry Grubert. 2004. Taxpayer responses to competitive tax
policies and tax policy responses to competitive taxpayers: Recent evidence. Tax Notes
International 34 (13): 1349-1362.
Altshuler, Rosanne, Harry Grubert, and T. Scott Newion. 2001. Has US investment
become more sensitive to tax rates? In International Taxation and Multinational Activity,
ed. James R. Hines Jr. University of Chicago Press.
Beliak, Christian, and Markus Leibrecht. 2009. Do low corporate income tax rates attract
FDI? Evidence from eight Central and East European countries. Applied Economics 41 (21):
2691-2703.
Banga, Rashmi. 2003. Impact of Government Policies and Investment Agreements on FDI
Inflows. Working Paper 116, Indian Council for Research on International Economic
Relations, New Delhi.
Cleeve, Emmanuel. 2008. How effective are fiscal incentives to attract FDI to sub-Saharan
Africa? /oum al o f Developing Areas 42 (1): 135-153.
de Mooij, Ruud Aloysius, and Sjef Ederveen. 2003. Taxation and Foreign Direct Invest
ment: A Synthesis of Empirical Research. International Tax and Public Finance 10 (6):
673-693. '
de Mooij, Ruud Aloysius, and Sjef Ederveen. 2008. Corporate Tax Elasticities: A Reader's
Guide to Empirical Findings. Working Paper 08/22, Oxford University Centre for Busi
ness Taxation.
Dharmapala, Dhammika, and James Hines. 2009. Which countries become tax havens?
journal o f Public Economics 93 (9-10): 1058-1068.
Fatica, Serena. Mar 2009. Taxation and the Quality of Institutions: Asymmetric Effects on
FDI. Taxation Paper 21, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union, European
Commission.
Gordon, Roger, and James R. Hines Jr. 2002. International taxation. In Handbook o f Public
Economics 1, volume 4, ed. A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein. Elsevier.
Goodspeed, Timothy ]., Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Li Zhang. 2011. Public policies and
FDI location: Differences between developing and developed countries. Finanz-Archiv 67
(2): 171-191.
Hines, James R., Jr. 2001. Tax sparing and direct investment in developing countries.
In International Taxation and Multinational Activity, ed. James R. Hines Jr. University of
Chicago Press.

Do Com panies View Bribes as a Tax?

63

Hines, James R., Jr., and Eric M. Rice. 1994. Fiscal paradise: Foreign tax havens and
American business. Quarterly Journal o f Economics 109 (1): 149-182.
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2009. Governance Matters VIII:
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2008. Policy Research Working
Paper 4978, World Bank.
Klemm, Alexander, and Stefan Van Parys. 2009. Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Tax
Incentives. Working Paper 09/136, International Monetary Fund.
Leff, Nathaniel. 1964. Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. American
Behavioral Scientist 8 (2): 8-14.
Liu, Francis. 1985. An equilibrium queuing model of bribery. Journal o f Political Economy
93 (4): 760-781.
Madies, Thierry, and Jean-Jacques Dethier. 2010. "Fiscal Competition in Developing
Countries: A Survey of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature." Policy Research
Working Paper 5311, World Bank Institute.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny. 1993. Corruption. Quarterly Journal o f Economics 109
(3): 599-617.
Wei, Shang-Jin. 2000a. How taxing is corruption on international investors? Review o f
Economics and Statistics 82 (1): 1-11.
Wei, Shang-Jin. 2000b. Local corruption and global capital flows. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 31 (2): 303-354.
Wei, Shang-Jin. 2001. Does corruption relieve foreign investors of the burden of taxes
and capital controls? In International Taxation and Multinational Activity, ed. James R.
Hines Jr. University of Chicago Press.

